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This paper examines the link between fuel prices and
sales of cars and trucks. U.S. automakers have long
denied that such a link exists. One source of this false
belief is an obsession with the crude count of units sold,
equating Hummers with Minis. Another source is the
conventional “wisdom” that Americans are unwilling to
pay for fuel economy. The paper presents theoretical rea-
sons and market evidence that refute Detroit’s conven-
tional wisdom. American manufacturers’ reaction to ris-
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ing fuel prices over the last few years revealed the short-
comings of the U.S. automakers’ recent product and pow-
ertrain strategies. The effect of rising fuel prices has, in
effect, been offset by reducing prices of vehicles in inverse
proportion to fuel economy. Thus, unit sales of large
SUVs could be maintained, but their revenue (and profit)
fell because vehicle prices were cut, directly or indirectly.
The paper concludes with a few practical guidelines that
business economists should use to prevent their compa-
nies from experiencing the recent massive losses experi-
enced by the U.S. automobile industry.
T
his paper tells a cautionary tale about what
can go wrong when manufacturers “forget”
that their demand curve slopes downward to
the right and that in a market with highly dif-
ferentiated products it is revenue not unit
sales that is the better indicator of business health. One is
hardly surprised when business leaders poorly trained in
economics, and unwilling to hire and listen to business
economists, make poor business choices. In truth, if busi-
ness leaders had a firmer grasp of economics, the demand
for economists would probably fall. The jobs of many eco-
nomic advisers depend on the ignorance of management.
However, the self-inflicted wounds and woes now
threatening the very survival of the domestic automotive
companies cannot be blamed on a dearth of economists.
U.S. automakers employ many smart economists, most of
whom have regular and influential contact with top deci-
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sion-makers. Moreover, if an in-house economist stum-
bles, hordes of economists who spend their days hunting
and gathering more and yet more data about the world’s
most researched industry are ready to freely offer their
insight in papers, press releases, and blogs.
With so many able economists on the case, it seems
rational to hope that automakers would rarely get the fun-
damental economics of their market wrong. But this hope,
however rational it may be, has been dashed by the expe-
riences of the last few years.
A tragically flawed belief inhabits the minds of the
domestic auto industry—the belief that the law of demand
does not apply to their market—in particular, that rising
fuel prices do not affect sales of light trucks and cars. One
source of this false belief is the industry’s obsession with
the monthly, quarterly, and yearly enumeration of vehicles
sold, an enumeration that equates Hummers with Minis.
Another source is the conventional “wisdom” that
Americans are unwilling to pay for fuel economy. 
This paper presents market evidence that refutes the
conventional Detroit wisdom and suggests that the rising
fuel prices over the last few years revealed the shortcomings
of the U.S. automakers’ product and powertrain strategies.
The paper concludes with a few practical guidelines
that business economists should use to prevent their com-
panies from experiencing the recent losses suffered by
Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation.
Vehicle Prices Since 9/11/01
The years since the 9/11 attacks have been remark-
able ones for the auto industry.1 At first, Americans,
stunned by the attacks and concerned about what might
happen next, appeared to put all discretionary purchas-
es—including purchases of new vehicles—on hold in the
days immediately following the attacks. U.S. automakers
were worried that in the aftermath of the attacks an
extended stoppage in sales could be devastating to them,
first to the auto industry but then spreading to the rest of
the economy.
The slowest sales day in September 2001 was neither
the 11th nor the 12th nor the 17th (when the stock mar-
kets reopened). The slowest sales day in September 2001
was the 19th, the day that Ronald Zarrella of GM
announced the company’s “Keep America Rolling” zero-
percent financing promotional campaign:
“We know this is a difficult time to talk
about an incentive program, but GM has a
responsibility to help stimulate the economy
by encouraging Americans to purchase vehi-
cles, to support our dealers and suppliers,
and to keep our plants operating and our
employees working.”2
With these words Zarrella launched a marketing cam-
paign that almost seemed like a price war, a very unusual
move for a high-cost producer.3 Ford and the Chrysler
Group quickly launched zero-percent financing programs
of their own. The “Keep America Rolling” price war last-
ed until March 2006, when GM announced that it was
switching tactics: it would set lower list prices, use fewer
incentives, and go to market as the “Value” leader.4
The impacts of the incentives war on real prices of
cars and trucks vehicles are readily apparent in Figure 1.
In September 2001, the real prices of both cars and trucks
had been falling at a quickening pace since 1995. The
flattening of that trend after September 2001 could be
misleading, since incentives in the form of zero or low
interest rate financing—the majority of incentive spend-
ing in October 2001 and a much larger share of incentives
after that than before 9/11—are not part of the CPI’s cal-
culation. Correcting the CPI for this omission would result
in a continuation of the trend. (See the Appendix for this
correction.)  The omission of non-cash incentives also
accounts for the apparently greater volatility of prices
1My discussion in this section relies on information on daily auto sales
from the Power Information Network. I later led a J.D. Power and
Associates team that developed within-month sales forecasts using
these data. Interest in daily sales rates had its origin in efforts in
September 2001 to take the pulse of the industry in a period of high
uncertainty when the conventional tools, all based on monthly infor-
mation, were useless.
2General Motors Corporation (2001).
3Zarrella resigned from GM on November 13, 2001 to assume the
chairmanship of Bausch & Lomb, so we do not know if he would have
pursued the price war with the same intensity his successors (Bob Lutz
and Rick Wagoner) did. It is suggestive that a key learning from the
Bausch & Lomb case study has a familiar tone, “Aggressive sales
drives…can, for a while, mask strategic business weaknesses.”
4General Motors Corporation (2006). Quotation marks were in the orig-
inal. 
Suggesting a direct link between
gasoline prices and SUV sales is
“poor analysis and poor 
journalism,” according to a
Detroit business economist 
(quoted in Automotive News, May 9, 2005).
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after 9/11, as the automakers switched back and forth
between cash and low-interest financing incentives, find-
ing new ways to lower prices to stimulate sales. In 2005,
the automakers added yet another form of incentive--
employee discounts for everyone--that the CPI does not
capture. Thus, real vehicle prices in the period since 9/11
have been falling at an unprecedented rate.
Vehicle Sales Since 9/11/01
Industry sales had been very strong for some time
when the 9/11 attacks happened. In the year before the
attacks, 2000, annual sales of light vehicles reached an all
time high of 17.3 million units. Sales in 1998 had already
passed the previous 1986 peak. The U.S. economy had
been in a recession since March 2001; but through
August, sales in 2001 were only five percent below what
they had been in 2000, a pace that would have made 2001
the second best year in history.
Would the recession have deepened if Zarrella and
GM had not launched the “keep America rolling” cam-
paign?  Did it in fact keep America rolling? We will never
know, but we do know that in terms of unit sales the indus-
try was already very strong in 2001 and that GM’s cam-
paign (and the matching campaigns of GM’s competitors)
was very effective in stimulating sales of vehicles. The
campaign included the month with the highest one-month
sales (seasonally-adjusted-at-annual-rate) in history
(October 2001, 21.7
million SAAR) and
the month with the
third-highest one-
month sales in his-
tory (July 2005,
20.7 million SAAR). 
Copeland and
Hall (2004) call
the 9/11 phenome-
non the automotive
“demand shock
that did not hap-
pen,” pointing to
the increase in
expenditure per
vehicle that oc-
curred with the
campaign. Many
consumers used
the opportunity of
zero-percent fi-
nancing to buy
more expensive
vehicles with more optional equipment than they other-
wise would have. This general increase in demand could
help explain why sales (in units) of SUVs would remain
steady in the face of rising fuel prices and operating costs.
Copeland and Hall (2004) attribute the impact of zero-
percent financing to its “simplicity” rather than to the
price reduction that the present value of saving finance
costs represents.
The price impact of zero-percent financing on expen-
diture per vehicle is simpler to justify than its transac-
tional “simplicity.”  Expenditure per vehicle rose because
prices of more expensive vehicles were reduced dispro-
portionately. In particular, the prices of SUVs and other
trucks relative to cars were lowered.
Was the correlation of high demand and falling prices
in recent years a true price war (a breakdown in tacit col-
lusion among the automakers), as Bresnahan (1987)
claims happened in 1955?  Not very likely, given the
number of brands and manufacturers selling in the United
States today compared to 1955. Did it reveal an attempt
by the incumbents to deter entry, as Plehn-Dujowich
(2006) suggests?  When the foreign “entrants” already
have a third of the market, it is probably too late to deter.
While price wars and entry deterrence could play some
small role in explaining the last several years, a simpler
explanation is found by looking at the effects of rising fuel
prices on the demand for vehicles.
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Gasoline Prices Since 9/11
The same period that saw vehicle prices falling at an
unprecedented rate, with unit sales remaining near their
historic highs, also saw fuel prices rising faster than they
had in 20 years. Table 1 documents the rapid and accel-
erating growth in nominal as well as real fuel prices that
have occurred since 2002.5 From 2002 to 2005, the pump
(nominal) price of gasoline rose nearly 70 percent, from
$1.34/gallon to $2.27/gallon. Over that same period, 2002
to 2005, the real (2005 terms) price of gasoline rose 56
percent. The real price of gasoline has risen by 14 percent
or more annually since 2002. 
In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina (August) and Rita
(September) hit the Gulf of Mexico’s oil production facili-
ties and sent fuel prices soaring. The nominal price of reg-
ular unleaded gasoline, which was $2.186/gallon in May,
before the seasonal rise in the summer, reached its high-
est ever level—$3.069/gallon in September.
Theory: Why Fuel Prices Matter
Despite the conventional wisdom of Detroit, econom-
ic theory predicts a direct link between fuel prices and
SUV sales, and more broadly between fuel prices and
vehicle sales. The purchase of a vehicle is an investment
decision: the purchase price is paid now, and the vehicle
yields services to its owner (or owners if it is later sold
used) over its useful life. However, the vehicle’s services
(mobility) require the ongoing input of fuel. To make a
rational choice at the time of purchase, the shopper needs
a prediction (simple or sophisticated) of what future fuel
prices are likely to be. 
The value of a vehicle to a consumer depends on the
attributes of the vehicle and the consumer’s preferences.
The “hedonic” equation, first suggested by Griliches
(1961), puts this assumption about valuation of vehicles
into a form that can be estimated:
1) Pit = α + β0Ιt + β1ht + β2ci + β3 ( ) +  εit
predictions: β1 > 0, β3 > 0
where
i = vehicle
t = year
a = age of vehicle
Pi = purchase price of vehicle i
It = real disposable income per capita in year t
hi = horsepower per ton of vehicle i
ci = curb weight (lb.) of vehicle i
β1 = marginal value of horsepower per ton
β2 = marginal value of curb weight
β3 = mo o
A
e(q+n-r) marginal value of fuel cost per mile
πo = price of fuel in year 0
mo = expected miles driven in period 0
fi = expected rate of economy for vehicle i
q = expected rate of change in real fuel price
n = expected rate of change in annual miles driven
r = real rate of interest
εit = error term for vehicle i in period t
The term β3 ( )in the hedonic equation measures
the present discounted value of the vehicle’s expected fuel
cost over its useful life. The calculation assumes that fuel
economy is constant over the life of a vehicle, but not annu-
al miles driven. The price of fuel could also change over
time, and the calculation defines the consumer’s expecta-
tions about future fuel prices and miles driven as simple
annual rates of change.
Expected annual miles driven fall with a vehicle’s age
for two reasons: (1) not all vehicles survive from one year to
the next, and the survival probability is incorporated in
expectations; and (2) many older vehicles become second or
third vehicles in multi-vehicle households and are driven
less. The miles a vehicle is driven at a specific age and year
in the future could also be inversely related to the fuel cost
per mile (p/f) that holds then. Rational consumers would
incorporate this “rebound” effect (lower fuel costs per mile
increase the demand for miles; higher fuel costs per mile
reduce the demand for miles) into their expectations.
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T A B L E  1
A V E R A G E  U . S .  R E T A I L  P R I C E  O F  U N L E A D E D  
R E G U L A R  G A S O L I N E
( D O L L A R S  P E R  G A L L O N )
NOMINAL Y/CHANGE REAL (‘05) Y/CHANGE
2002 $1.34 - $1.46 -
2003 $1.56 16% $1.66 14%
2004 $1.85 19% $1.91 16%
2005 $2.27 23% $2.27 19%
2005 H1 $2.06 - $2.08 -
2006 H1 $2.59 26% $2.53 21%
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
πo
fi
πo
fi
5The UMTRI detailed data on prices, sales, and attributes covers vehi-
cles sold in the United States in 2002-05. Fuel prices have been gen-
erally rising since 1999--2002 was the most recent local minimum,
and prices have steadily risen since then (year/year).
What happens to
the relative value of
two vehicles when
the expected future
prices of fuel in-
crease?  The answer
obviously depends
on the vehicles’ rela-
tive fuel econ-
omies—the cost of
operating both vehi-
cles would rise, but
the cost of operating
the vehicle with
lower fuel economy
would rise relative to
the cost of operating
the more fuel-effi-
cient vehicle. All
else equal, this
would increase the
demand for the more
fuel-efficient vehicle
relative to that of the less fuel-efficient vehicle. In the
hedonic model, the increased demand for fuel-efficient
vehicles is expressed as a higher purchase price that con-
sumers are willing to pay.
This simple hedonic model predicts a positive rela-
tionship between fuel price and demand for more fuel-
efficient vehicles (a negative relationship between fuel
prices and demand for less fuel-efficient vehicles). If
manufacturers do not want to accept lower sales volumes
of less fuel-efficient vehicles when fuel prices rise, then
they can accept lower prices and maintain sales units. The
next sections of the paper describe the empirical tests we
performed of the model’s prediction (one using monthly
data--Jan-84 to Oct-06--for aggregated products and the
other using disaggregated data on hundreds of vehicles
over four years). Both provide compelling evidence of a
direct connection between fuel prices and sales of vehi-
cles with different fuel economy.
Evidence from Aggregate Data
Our first test of whether fuel prices influence the rel-
ative prices of vehicles as predicted by our simple model
(a rise in fuel prices induces a rise in the relative price of
more fuel-efficient vehicles) uses highly aggregated data
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price
Index. The Bureau publishes monthly observations on the
average price of a gallon of unleaded regular gasoline and
on price indices for cars, trucks, and all items. Overall,
cars have higher fuel economy than trucks do, so we
expect fuel prices to be positively related to the car/truck
price ratio. It is worth noting, however, that the vehicles
classified as trucks are highly diverse, ranging from large
SUVs that have very low fuel economy to small crossover
vehicles that look like SUVs but are based on cars and
have very high fuel economy. We should not be surprised
if the effect we are looking for is small. Nonetheless,
Figure 2, which plots the data on the real price of gasoline
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F I G U R E  2
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T A B L E  2
R E A L  R E T A I L  T R A N S A C T I O N  P R I C E  
R E G R E S S I O N
COEFFICEINT ELASTICITY
Constant -69,165.53
(4.73)**
Real Disposable Income 0.245 0.190
per Capita ($) -0.55
Horsepower per ton 630.607 1.886
(23.67)**
Curb Weight (lb) 10.501 1.090
(15.00)**
FuelPrice/MPG -768.002 -0.161
(4.82)**
Observations 1468
No. individual vehicle 445
models
Absolute value of z statistics in parantheses
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Dummy variables to represent individual brands are not shown.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
and the price of cars divided by the price of trucks, seems
to have the predicted positive correlation, certainly since
1999.  However, given the variety of offerings in the light
vehicle market, aggregate data are not definitive; and the
best approach to capturing the effect of fuel prices on
automobile prices would seem to be a combination of
cross-section and time-series data that take into account
those characteristics that vary across brands.
Evidence from Cross-Section Time-Series Data
The second test of the link between fuel prices and
vehicle prices uses data covering 445 vehicles for 2002-
05. The cross-section (vehicle level) data include the
retail transaction price, performance (horsepower/ton),
size (curb weight), and fuel economy. The time-series
(year level) data include the real price of gasoline and the
real disposable income per capita. The transaction prices
came from several sources, including Edmunds.com,
Power Information Network, and the National Automobile
Dealers Association. The vehicle attributes came from
NHTSA fuel economy records.
The hedonic regression parameter estimates, based on
equation 1, are shown in Table 3. An issue that arises with
time-series cross-section data is whether the error term,
εit is made up of random effects or fixed effects (fixed
effects would be
equivalent to having
a dummy variable
for each vehicle).
The Breusch and
Pagan (1980) Lag-
rangian multiplier
test for random
effects rejected the
hypothesis that the
variances within
vehicle are zero in
favor of the random
effects model. Thus,
dummy variables
were introduced to
represent each brand.
The hedonic regres-
sion is also adjusted
for autocorrelation in
the residuals within
vehicles. 
The coeffi-
cients have the pre-
dicted signs. More
horsepower per ton
and more curb weight are associated with a higher vehicle
price, and higher fuel cost per mile is associated with a
lower vehicle price. The link between fuel prices and
vehicle prices is confirmed. The impact of fuel prices on
vehicle prices depends on fuel economy—the lower the
fuel economy the greater the impact of a specific change
in fuel price on the vehicle price. The implications for
large SUVs and small cars are shown in Figure 3. From
2002 to 2005 the price of fuel rose from $1.46/gal to
$2.27/gal (real 2005 dollars). Based on the hedonic esti-
mates, the negative impact of this fuel price increase on
the average large SUV price would be $1,900 greater than
its impact on the average small car price, given their very
different fuel economy levels. In fact, the average large
SUV price fell $2,300 more between 2002 and 2005 than
the average small car price did.
Summary and Recommendations
At the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United
States, the real prices of cars and trucks had been falling
for almost six years at an accelerating rate. Data collected
by the government for the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
suggest that in the four years since 9/11 car and truck
prices continued to fall, but no longer at an increasing
rate. However, the CPI does not measure the effects of
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incentives in the form of zero- and low-interest loans,
which the automakers turned to after 9/11, in addition to
cash rebates, to stimulate sales. When all forms of incen-
tives are taken into account, it is clear that the CPI statis-
tics do not represent the buyers’ costs of purchasing new
vehicles, and that real car and truck prices continued to
fall at an increasing rate through 2005. Automakers have
been engaged in very fierce price competition for almost a
decade, and the data suggest that the competition has
become fiercer over time.
We presented evidence that a significant portion of
changes in vehicle prices can be explained by changes in
fuel prices. In highly aggregated monthly data (1/84-10/06)
on car and truck prices, this paper shows that rising fuel
prices lower prices of both cars and trucks. Moreover, they
lower the prices of trucks more than the prices of cars. In
disaggregate data on 445 individual vehicles for 2002 to
2005, we showed that the negative impact of rising fuel
prices on vehicle prices is greater for less fuel efficient
vehicles than for more fuel efficient vehicles.
Detroit maintained well into 2005 that rising fuel
prices were not having an impact on sales of less fuel-effi-
cient, more profitable SUVs. It is difficult to explain this
lapse in sound economic analysis. Perhaps public state-
ments concerning sales forecasting and sales reporting
have become more public relations than economics, and
the denial of a link between fuel prices and sales was
helpful in justifying decisions that had already been
made. Perhaps the practice of defining “sales” as the
crude count of units sold, which may be appropriate for
production planning but not marketing, meant that econ-
omists spent too much time explaining differences in unit
sales and thus missed the impact of the actual changes in
prices. Perhaps the weight of Detroit’s challenge to slow
the ongoing loss of market share to Japan and Europe (and
the fact that whenever Detroit’s incentives slowed so did
Detroit’s sales) made digging into the details a low priority.
Whatever the reasons, Detroit did not accept or pub-
licly admit the link between fuel prices and vehicle
demand until it was impossible to ignore. The industry
would have benefited from a greater adherence to the prin-
ciples of economics. What should business economists in
other industries do to help avoid the mistakes of the auto
industry? Here are a few principles that should help.
1. Report the brutal facts to management, investors, the
media, and the public. Economists should be trying to
inform their audiences, not trying to form their audi-
ences’ opinions.
2. Let economic theory guide analysis; maintain a
healthy skepticism about conventional wisdom.
3. Track unit sales, prices of your industry’s products,
and the prices of other goods that influence your
industry. In doing this economists will be doing their
part to ensure that there are no (economic) surprises to
management. Economists should have been the first to
identify the impact of fuel prices.
4. Forecast defensively. If there are factors that can have
good or bad effects on your market, then you should
report your forecast in a range.
5. Forecast realistically. If
management insists on a
point estimate, then teach
them about risk and uncer-
tainty. Failing that, your point
estimate should be on the
“bad effects” side.
Appendix: Correcting
Prices for Incentives
Figure 4 shows the annu-
al changes in real vehicle
prices measured by the CPI
along with Corrado et al’s.
(2006) estimates of changes
in real vehicle prices from
transaction-level information
from Power Information.
Corrado et al. matched prod-
ucts year to year to measure
real price changed. The
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F I G U R E  4
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upper and lower limits depend on what is treated as a new
product. The upper limit treats redesigns and new entries
as new products; the lower limit treats all models as new
products each year. The lower limit is further away from
the CPI than the upper limit is, suggesting that the CPI
should be pulled down to reflect the impact of incentives
in the form of low-rate financing.
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